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MAGISTER ELEPHANTORVM: A REAPPRAISAL OF
HANNIBAL’S USE OF ELEPHANTS
ABSTRACT: This article, which examines all the available evidence for
Hannibal’s use of elephants in the Second Punic War, refutes the conten-
tion that Hannibal was especially innovative in his tactical use of the beasts.
In addition, greater reliance on elephants in Italy, particularly after his
success at the Trebia, would have hindered Hannibal in his lengthy cam-
paign against Rome. The article also contends that Hannibal’s use of massed
elephants at Zama highlights the degree to which he was accustomed to
take chances in the field, especially given his demonstrable familiarity with
the fickle nature of elephants when used for military purposes.
Over the years, much has been written about the Carthaginian
general Hannibal and his use of elephants during the Second Punic
War.1 Outwardly, it might appear as if the topic were a closed one
and that there is little new to add. Despite this, a recent article by
Jacob Edwards has added something new—and indeed controversial—
by arguing that Hannibal might have achieved much more success
in Italy than he did if a greater number of his elephants had sur-
vived the arduous trek across the Alps.2 Edwards also suggests that
“Hannibal’s use of elephants is one of thwarted genius,”3 the impli-
cation being that Hannibal had developed an almost unique grasp
of the manner in which elephants could be used in warfare. In-
deed, Edwards concludes his discussion with the claim that “Hannibal
. . . more than anyone else . . . threatened to extend this animal
to its full military potential.”4 But Edwards’ article, as it turns out,
harbors a number of misconceptions that need to be addressed in
detail. Hannibal, though he certainly did do something new from a
logistical perspective, did not, at a tactical level, contribute anything
demonstrably innovative to elephant warfare, other than perhaps ex-
ercising a more rigorous control of the beasts on the battlefield than
had previously been achieved (if one version of events is believed).
Aside from this, the present article will demonstrate that his use of
elephants was more or less conventional.
Hannibal could never have defeated Rome, as Edwards suggests,
merely through the deployment of elephants. Still, Hannibal deserves
credit for making do with the resources that he had, even though,
at Zama in 202 B.C.E., his stratagem of employing a frontal elephant
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1 Translations in this paper are generally either verbatim or slightly adapted
from the relevant Loeb Classical Library volume, with the exception of Eutropius
and Zonaras (our translations) and Polyaenus (translation of P. Krentz and E. L.
Wheeler, Polyaenus: Stratagems of Wars, 2 vols. [Chicago 1994]). The authors would
like to thank Brian Jones and Tom Stevenson for reading earlier versions of this
draft, in addition to CW’s anonymous referee for helpful comments.
2 J. Edwards, “The Irony of Hannibal’s Elephants,” Latomus 60 (2001) 900–5:
“His decision to bring these animals across the Alps may well have brought him
victory in Italy had the elephants not died en route” (905).
3 Edwards (above, n.2) 905.
4 Edwards (above, n.2) 905.
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assault failed and ultimately aided the Roman cause.5 Thus, while
the minimal impact of pachyderms on the outcome of the Second
Punic War should have resulted in Hannibal’s use of elephants be-
ing relegated to a footnote in history, his handling of the beasts,
given that it remains a matter of some controversy, still warrants
our attention. This is especially so given that a cohesive analysis of
Hannibal’s use of elephants at a tactical level remains lacking. Be-
fore we begin, it should be noted that this discussion will focus
primarily on engagements between elephants and Roman heavy in-
fantry during the First and Second Punic Wars. Information regarding
the military use of elephants among the various Hellenistic mon-
archs will only be adduced, with the notable exception of Pyrrhus,
when it sheds light on Carthaginian practice.6
I. Elephant Varieties: Indian vs. African
A word on elephant biology is required. Some of the concepts
discussed immediately below may not be entirely new to specialist
readers, but a brief explanation is needed for the benefit of others.
Edwards shows himself to be aware of “African” and “Indian” ele-
phants.7 Yet he does not address the issue of exactly which type
Hannibal took with him to Italy or which type was employed at
Zama. What Edwards fails to mention is the existence of a third
type of elephant aside from the “standard” Indian and African vari-
eties. The Indian elephant (Elephas maximus),8 with its bulging forehead,
smaller ears, and arched back, is the one familiar to us from child-
hood excursions to zoos and circuses. The second largest of the elephants,
it is still employed today in many parts of Southeast Asia as a beast
of burden. In the past, it was widely used in warfare. There are
two “types,” however, of African elephant. The one most immedi-
ately recognizable is the largest existing pachyderm and is known
as the African bush or savannah elephant (Loxodonta africana). It
is characterized by much larger ears than the Indian variety, a flat
forehead, and a concave back. The ancients almost certainly never
used this type of elephant for combat duty. But what of the third
type? This beast is also an “African” elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis),
but is somewhat smaller in size than the other varieties, though it
shares many of the physical features of its larger African cousin.9
5 This is even admitted by Edwards (above, n.2) 903 earlier in his article,
when he discusses the battle of Zama.
6 It is hoped that elephants in the Hellenistic world will become the subject
of a future study; see also M. B. Charles, “Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting
Polybius 5.84–85,” CQ 57 (2007) 306–11.
7 Edwards (above, n.2) 902 n.13.
8 The “Indian Elephant” comprises three subspecies. Bulls of the larger sub-
species can reach up to three and a half meters at the shoulder. There exists a
high degree of sexual dimorphism.
9 Bush elephants can grow to a height of four meters at the shoulder, while
the forest variety does not reach higher than three meters and weighs only about
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Today, these forest elephants, as they are called, are no longer found
in northern Africa, where once they were relatively common. Al-
though Wise, in his discussion of Carthaginian elephants, describes
them as “now extinct,”10 they still inhabit tropical regions of the
continent. Gowers believes that forest elephants were first captured
and trained for warfare “about 285 B.C.”11
Although O’Bryhim, following Scullard, uses the caveat “prob-
ably,” it is almost certain that Hannibal brought forest elephants with
him to Italy in 218 B.C.E. and later employed them again in much
larger numbers at Zama in 202 B.C.E.12 Some have tried to show
that Hannibal crossed the Alps with at least some Indian elephants,
but this line of thought, it seems, is largely based on a faulty inter-
pretation of Polybius’ frequent use of 4νδ+ς (literally, “Indian”), which
is used, as Prevas rightly points out, as “a generic term meaning
elephant driver rather than specifically an Indian.”13 That Polybius
refers to Carthaginian elephant drivers as “Indians” therefore tells
us little, for Indians were the original expert elephant trainers, and
the name 4νδ+ς consequently stuck.14 When the forest elephant began
to be trained for warfare, it must have seemed only natural to take
half as much as its larger cousins; only a moderate degree of sexual dimorphism
occurs. Recent scientific literature holds that the bush and forest elephants are full
species (previously subspecies Loxodonta africana africana and Loxodonta africana
cyclotis, respectively); see A. Duff and A. Lawson, Mammals of the World: A Checklist
(London 2004) 209, 229 (“Appendix: New species”), which follows P. Grubb, C. P.
Groves, J. P. Dudley, and J. Shoshani, “Living African Elephants Belong to Two
Species: Loxodonta africana (Blumenbach, 1797) and Loxodonta cyclotis (Matschie,
1900),” Elephant 2.4 (2004) 1–4.
10 T. Wise, Armies of the Carthaginian Wars 265–146 B.C. (London 1982)
12. Likewise, J. F. Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal’s
Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C.,” Historia 45 (1996) 174: “now extinct
. . . [in northern Africa].”
11 W. Gowers, “The African Elephant in Warfare,” African Affairs 46 (1947)
43. The first recorded use of elephants by Carthage was in 262 B.C.E. H. H. Scullard
(The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World [London 1974] 146) believes that
this means that Carthaginian elephants were first captured and trained “at least two
or three decades earlier.” These views were first expressed in Scullard, “Hannibal’s
Elephants,” NC, 6th ser., 8 (1948) 159. But the recruitment of skilled elephant han-
dlers from eastern states could have expedited matters.
12 S. O’Bryhim, “Hannibal’s Elephants and the Crossing of the Rhône,” CQ
41 (1991) 122 n.6. See especially W. Gowers and H. H. Scullard, “Hannibal’s El-
ephants Again,” NC, 6th ser., 10 (1950) 271–83. G. de Beer (Alps and Elephants:
Hannibal’s March [London 1955] 93–94), using numismatic evidence, correctly identifies
the elephants as “of the small forest type, variety cyclotis,” repeated in de Beer,
Hannibal: The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean (London 1969) 102. It has
been suggested that “at least one” Indian elephant was used by Hannibal; on this,
see de Beer, Alps and Elephants, 96. See also L. Cottrell, Enemy of Rome (London
and Sydney, 1962) 37.
13 J. Prevas, Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of Italy and the Punic
Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1998) 61; see also 60. Likewise, de Beer, Alps and Ele-
phants (above, n.12) 95; Gowers (above, n.11) 43; and M. Launey, Recherches sur
les armées hellénistiques, vol. 1 (Paris 1949) 587. W. R. Paton (Polybius: The His-
tories, vol. 1 [London and New York, 1922] 115) translates the word as “mahouts.”
14 Pliny (HN 8.1.3, 8.5.15, 8.7.24) uses rector to describe the elephant driver.
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advantage of the expertise of eastern mahouts. In addition, it is not
inconceivable that these men could have been employed to train lo-
cal elephant handlers. At least one of Hannibal’s elephants, it has
been argued, was indeed of the Indian variety. Numismatic evidence
has been used to demonstrate this.15 In addition, the elder Pliny (HN
8.5.11) records that Cato the Elder stated that the bravest of the
Carthaginian elephants was called Surus, or “the Syrian.” Syria was
the land whence the Ptolemaic Indian elephants came, so it is gen-
erally supposed that this beast was not of the African type, but was
descended from examples brought to Syria and thence to Egypt.16
Yet the locus does not associate Surus with Hannibal, although Scullard
does muster some supporting evidence.17
The question of elephant types is important, for the forest el-
ephant may not have been employed in exactly the same way as the
Indian species, perhaps owing to its smaller size. While most of us
visualize war elephants with towers or howdahs (turres or πupsilonacuteργοι)
perched on their backs housing missile-wielding soldiers or archers,
this arrangement is most readily associated with Indian elephants.18
Although Sabin writes that the “literary and archaeological sources
are ambiguous on whether Punic war elephants carried towers with
fighting crewman,”19 the numismatic evidence is instructive. While
none of the coins that have been recovered provides unequivocal
15 Gowers and Scullard (above, n.12) 278–82, with Scullard, The Elephant (above,
n.11) 170. The coins in question are perhaps of Campanian origin; for representa-
tions, see E. S. G. Robinson, “Carthaginian and Other South Italian Coinages of
the Second Punic War,” NC, 7th ser., 4 (1964) pls. V.5, V.6, and V.7, with 41. Of
interest is that the beasts on the first two coins carry turrets. These animals may
represent reinforcements that arrived in 215 B.C.E.; see Livy 23.41.10, with n.68
below. Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 243, postulates that Hannibal may have
used turreted Indians in siege warfare.
16 De Beer, Alps and Elephants (above, n.12) 96, and Prevas (above, n.13) 61.
Scullard (“Hannibal’s Elephants” [above, n.11] 166) associates this beast with that
ridden by Hannibal in 217 B.C.E.; see Livy 22.2.10: “the sole surviving elephant”
(elephanto qui unus superfuerat).
17 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 174–77. This follows on from a more
detailed discussion by Gowers and Scullard (above, n.12) 278–80.
18 Armed crewmen are attested for Porus’ elephants at the Hydaspes (326 B.C.E.).
These animals probably carried a mahout and one/?two javelin-wielding soldier(s)
mounted on the beast’s back; for a representation, see S. Reinach, “Elephas,” in C.
Daremberg and E. Saglio, eds., Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines
d’après les textes et les monuments, vol. 2.1 (Paris 1892) 538, fig. 2621 (line drawing),
and J. Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (London 1980) 84 (photograph). It is
generally believed that Pyrrhus introduced turrets. Zonaras, in his description of
Heraclea (8.3), places “turrets” (πupsilonacuteργοι) on Pyrrhus’ animals.
19 P. Sabin, “The Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War,” in T. Cornell,
B. Rankov, and P. Sabin, eds., The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, BICS Supplement
67 (London 1996) 70 n.76; see also Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 240–45.
D. Head (Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars, 359 B.C. to 146 B.C. [Goring-
by-Sea, Sussex, 1982] 187) holds that “it seems to me highly probable that Carthaginian
elephants did in fact use towers”; Warry (above, n.18) 95 writes that it is “uncer-
tain,” but believes that Ptolemaic forest elephants “certainly did so.”
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proof of Carthaginian African elephants being so equipped, a Punic
silver coin of c. 220 B.C.E. depicts a forest elephant, clearly identi-
fied as such on account of its markedly concave back and large ears,
with a goad-carrying mahout (4νδ+ς) on top—and no turret.20 One
might well assume that the coin in question is an accurate repre-
sentation of a Carthaginian war elephant girt for battle.21
On the other hand, Pliny writes, in a very general sense, that
“male elephants when broken in serve in battle and carry castles
manned with armed warriors on their backs; they are the most im-
portant factor in eastern warfare, scattering the ranks before them
and trampling armed soldiers underfoot” (domiti militant et turres
armatorum in dorsis ferunt, magnaque ex parte orientis bella conficiunt:
prosternunt acies, proterunt armatos, HN 8.9.27). Moreover, at the
battle of Raphia, waged between Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III (217
B.C.E.), we read of Ptolemaic African elephants and Seleucid Indi-
ans, in addition to a clash between turret-equipped elephants. But
the relevant passage in Polybius is ambiguous.22 This is especially
so given that only a few of Ptolemy’s elephants proved brave enough
to combat the enemy beasts.23 It could be that the combatant ani-
mals were all (or almost all) of the Indian variety, for the Africans
that refused to engage the enemy beasts owing to their greater size
are introduced only after the elephant tussle has taken place (Polyb.
5.84.5).24 Scullard, following Gowers’ earlier opinion,25 mentions the
possibility of the “brave” Ptolemaic elephants being Indians that Ptolemy
had inherited from his father, which would mean that the turret-
equipped adversaries fought each other as “equals.”26 Whatever the
case, this passage has cemented the view that African elephants “were
in fact inferior in size, and probably also in training and discipline,
to Indian elephants.”27
Likewise, while the Romans had African elephants at Magnesia
(190 B.C), they, cognizant of their inferiority (“African elephants cannot
20 For a clear representation, see Wise (above, n.10) 9 (with commentary).
21 Indeed, Gowers (above, n.11) 43 has suggested that this particularly realis-
tic coin shows one of the elephants that would soon be taken across the Alps.
22 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 140 describes it as “somewhat ob-
scure.”
23 See Polyb. 5.84.2. Antiochus’ 102 elephants outnumbered Ptolemy’s 73. The
beasts were divided and placed on the wings, generally in front of the cavalry units.
On this, see Polyb. 5.82.7–13. A diagram of the dispositions is found at Scullard,
The Elephant (above, n.11) 141, fig. 16.
24 For detailed analysis, see Charles (above, n.6).
25 W. Gowers, “African Elephants and Ancient Authors,” African Affairs 47
(1948) 174, with Gowers and Scullard (above, n.12) 276.
26 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 142. Cosmas, writing in the sixth cen-
tury C.E. (for text, see Dittenberger OGI I.54), tells us that Ptolemy III captured
Indian elephants when he invaded Seleucid territory during the Third Syrian War
of 246–241 B.C.E.; see also Gowers and Scullard (above, n.12) 276.
27 Gowers (above, n.11) 44. Note Pliny, HN 8.9.27, 8.11.32; but see also HN
8.13.35.
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resist even an equal number of Indian,” ne pari quidem numero Indicis
Africi resistunt), declined to pit them against the Indians of Antiochus
III (Livy 37.39.13), perhaps because these were equipped with “towers
placed upon their backs” (tergo impositae turres), whereas those of
the Romans were not (Livy 37.40.4).28 Yet the failure of the Afri-
can elephants at Raphia merely counterbalances the enormous success
achieved by Xanthippus’ Africans against Regulus in the First Punic
War. Indeed, forest elephants—surely the main type used through-
out Hannibal’s campaigns—can lay claim to both the most decisive
win and also the most decisive loss involving either breed, viz., Tunis
(Bagradas valley) in 255 B.C.E. and Zama in 202 B.C.E., respectively.
In this article, we assume, pace Silius Italicus,29 that African elephants
used in warfare by Carthage were not equipped with turrets (at least
in pitched battles)30 and so would have been used as mobile batter-
ing rams.31
II. Rome vs. Elephant: The Double-Edged Sword
In order to assess what Hannibal expected from his elephants,
it is necessary to look at the various occasions when elephants were
successfully deployed against Roman forces. This is important in order
to demonstrate that Hannibal, presumably a keen student of mili-
tary tactics, would not have been unaware of the dangers that arose
when elephants were deployed in battle. In short, it emerges that,
although elephants could strike terror into inexperienced troops (and
especially horses), the animals were just as likely to turn on their
own ranks if defenders stood their ground and retaliated. Let us re-
view some of these instances.
28 According to Livy (37.39.13), the Romans had sixteen elephants and the
king fifty-four. At Pydna, in 168 B.C.E., the Roman forces used against the Macedonian
king Perseus seem to have included African elephants provided by Masinissa (Livy
42.62.2, 43.6.13), in addition to some obtained from Antiochus IV. These Syrian
beasts, according to Polyaenus (4.21), were Indian.
29 Silius Italicus writes of turret-equipped Carthaginian elephants at the Trebia
(Pun. 4.599) and in the aftermath of Zama (Pun. 17.621). But we need not give
this “testimony” too much credence given the epic’s highly fanciful nature, though
Silius does demonstrate his awareness of the elephants’ African origin, e.g., at Pun.
3.459.
30 This follows Scullard, “Hannibal’s Elephants” (above, n.11) 159–60, with
n.9; but see 166, where a coin showing a Hannibalic elephant with a tower is ad-
duced (Scullard suggests that the tower might be for “ceremonial purposes,” or else
was used in “static fighting”). In addition, the Bellum Africum makes reference to
turreted elephants, presumably of the forest variety, at B Afr. 30.2, 41.2, 86.1. Scullard,
“Hannibal’s Elephants” (above, n.11) 162 n.9, rightly points out that these refer-
ences “can scarcely be used for third-century Carthaginian practice.”
31 Perhaps such beasts could wear armor. A statuette shows an African el-
ephant wearing scale armor on its flanks and a frontal, below which seems to appear
lamellar armor on the trunk (see Livy 37.40.4, where we find a description of ar-
mored Seleucid elephants at Magnesia in 190 B.C.E., which beasts were Indian).
For a representation, see N. Sekunda, Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168–
145, vol. 1 (Stockport 1994) figs. 52 and 53; Reinach (above, n.18) 540 fig. 2625.
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At the battle of Heraclea (280 B.C.E.), the Epirote king Pyrrhus
introduced the Romans to elephant warfare.32 Just when it seemed
that the Romans might carry the day, Pyrrhus deployed his elephants
(Flor. 1.13.8). The Roman cavalry were terrified “by their huge bulk
and ugliness and also by their strange smell and trumpeting” (quo-
rum cum magnitudine tum deformitate et nouo odore simul ac stridore),
and a terrible panic ensued (Flor. 1.13.8). Many men were trampled
to death (Flor. 1.13.17).33 At Asculum (279 B.C.E.), Pyrrhus posted
strong contingents of archers and slingers between his elephants with
“his heavy infantry” (τοupsilongraveς =πλτας) in front of them (Plut. Pyrrh.
21.6). After the heavy infantry had weakened the Roman center, the
elephants34 were allowed to charge the point deemed most likely to
break (Plut. Pyrrh. 21.7). Despite Florus’ assertion (1.13.9–10) that
the Romans, by this stage, had the elephants’ measure,35 these beasts
inflicted considerable damage. Plutarch, for one, holds that the ele-
phant charge, which forced the Romans to retreat, was the deciding
factor in this engagement (Pyrrh. 21.7).
At Beneventum (275 B.C.E.), Pyrrhus fielded “his most warlike
elephants” (τ>ν θηρων τ- μαχιμ>τατα, Plut. Pyrrh. 25.2). But, al-
though the animals were initially successful in throwing back the
opposing infantry, the elephants’ impact was blunted after the de-
fending Roman troops attacked them with missiles (Plut. Pyrrh. 25.5).
The elephants were thrown into confusion, to the extent that they
trampled down their own troops (Plut. Pyrrh. 25.5; Flor. 1.13.12).36
Plutarch believes that this particular action “gave the victory to the
Romans” (C τ' νκημα παρδωκε το!ς DΡωμαοις, Pyrrh. 25.5).37 Thus,
we have seen that, though Pyrrhus gained some early successes with
elephants, experience of pachyderms on the part of the defender could
be used to advantage when facing an elephant attack (important to
32 Unfortunately, Livy’s account of the Pyrrhic Wars (books 12–14) has not
survived. Only very brief summaries of the relevant books remain.
33 Plutarch provides little detail about the manner in which the Epirote ele-
phants were used at Heraclea, other than that they terrified the Roman cavalry (Pyrrh.
17.3). The coup de grâce was a charge, headed by the king himself, of the Thessalian
cavalry; see also Eutr. Brev. 2.11.3.
34 The beasts had been named “Lucan oxen” (boues Lucas) by the Romans
(Plin. HN 8.6.16).
35 Flor. 1.13.9: “by this time, to be sure, the terror inspired by the monsters
had passed way” (iam quippe terror beluarum exoleuerat). We are told that “jav-
elins” (pila) and “torches” (faces) were used against the elephants themselves and
their “towers” (turres), respectively (Flor. 1.13.10). Eutropius, at Brev. 2.13.4, also
seems to have followed the same chauvinistic tradition: “the elephants were killed”
(elephanti interfecti).
36 Florus (1.13.12) provides the story that an elephant calf was struck on the
head by a missile and that its mother, hearing its cries, about-faced into her own
ranks.
37 Pyrrhus also experienced problems with maddened elephants (and one called
Nicon in particular) during a nocturnal attack on Argos in 272 B.C.E. (see Plut.
Pyrrh. 33.4–5).
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remember when considering Zama). As Florus conveniently summa-
rizes, “the same beasts, which deprived the Romans of their victory
and equalized the second battle, gave them undoubted victory in the
third fight” (eaedem ferae, quae primam uictoriam abstulerunt, secundam
parem fecerunt, tertiam sine controuersia tradiderunt, 1.13.13). In-
deed, when initial fear dissipated, resolute defending troops could
effectively harass the beasts and send them into a maddened rage.38
When this occurred, there was no telling whom the animals might
trample. Hannibal surely must have heard or read accounts of what
happened to the Epirote elephants. Despite this, Pyrrhus’ setbacks
did not discourage the Carthaginian general from deploying elephants
in similar fashion.
Elephants were also problematic in siege warfare. Hasdrubal tried
to use them in 250 B.C.E. at Panormus,39 but the defenders showered
them with missiles, an action which prompted the beasts to rush at
the Carthaginians arrayed behind them (Polyb. 1.40.12–13). Metellus,
seizing upon the resultant confusion, launched a successful counter-
attack, during which all the Punic elephants were either captured or
killed (Polyb. 1.40.14–15). A comparable incident, though it occurred
after the Second Punic War, might also be adduced. Ten elephants
provided by the Numidian king Masinissa were used by Rome dur-
ing the siege of Numantia (153 B.C.E.). The Roman commander Nobilior
employed them to dismantle the hitherto impregnable city walls (App.
Hisp. 9.46). All seemed to be going well until a fragment of the
wall tumbled onto the head of one of the elephants (App. Ib. 9.46).
The wounded beast became so enraged that he trampled both friend
and foe alike, an action which provoked his companions to behave
similarly (App. Hisp. 9.46). Although not a battlefield incident, it
does demonstrate, once again, that stricken elephants could prove
more dangerous to the deploying side than to the enemy. Glover
goes so far as to suggest that elephants were “as independable as
poison gas, which with a change of wind turns and confuses those
who employed it.”40
Even more relevant is that Hannibal would have been aware of
a major failure of Punic elephants against Roman troops that oc-
curred not long before Zama. Indeed, the Metaurus campaign (207
B.C.E.) was the last time that Roman troops would engage elephants
38 At Plin. HN 8.7.18, we read that, in the Pyrrhic Wars, it was found to be
“very easy to lop off an elephant’s trunk” (proboscidem eorum facillime amputari).
39 On this battle, see M. G. Morgan, “Polybius and the Date of Panormus,”
CQ n.s. 22 (1972) 121–29.
40 R. F. Glover, “The Tactical Handling of the Elephant,” G&R 17 (1948) 11.
In addition, T. A. Dodge, Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians
and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a Detailed Account of the
Second Punic War (New York 1891; fasc. ed. 1995) 25, 119; C. I. Archer, J. R.
Ferris, J. R. Herwig, and T. H. E. Travers, World History of Warfare (Lincoln 2002)
81; and Gowers (above, n.11) 45 express comparable opinions. For similar ancient
thoughts, see App. Hisp. 9.46; Plin. HN 8.9.27.
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in Italy.41 Polybius (11.1.3) and Livy (27.48.5) tell us that the ten
creatures in Hasdrubal Barca’s possession were placed initially in
the front rank towards the center of the field.42 Livy (27.48.10) claims
that they achieved, at first, some success against their targets. But
Hasdrubal had no real faith in the beasts, and the mahouts had even
been ordered to “scuttle” their charges, if they could not be con-
trolled, by means of a chisel blow to the base of the skull. This,
according to Livy (27.49.2), was an innovation on Hasdrubal’s part.
After causing some disturbance to the legionaries that they faced,
some of the ten elephants were destroyed by their mahouts, pre-
sumably on account of their unwieldy behavior (Livy 27.49.1).43 Of
note is Polybius’ wry assertion that Hasdrubal’s beasts “had been
of equal service to both sides in the battle” (τ τε θηρα κοινFν μφο!ν
παρεχοντο τFν χρεαν ν τG μχ2, 11.1.8). In the end, six of the beasts
were destroyed, and the remaining four animals, now driverless, were
captured (Polyb. 11.1.12). In any case, the small number of elephants
could not have decided the battle’s outcome.44
Hannibal must have known that P. Cornelius Scipio, eventually
surnamed Africanus, had defeated elephants at Ilipa, Spain, in 206
B.C.E. Polybius tells us that the custom of the Carthaginian general
Hasdrubal (son of Gisgo) was to station his Libyan infantry in the
center of his line and draw up his thirty-two elephants (11.20.2)
“in front of the two wings” (τ- δ; θηρα προτιθμενον @κατρων τHν
κερτων, 11.22.2). When a pitched battle eventually ensued after days
of feinting, Scipio used his cavalry and uelites to harass the elephants,
which, after they had been “assailed by the missiles . . . and ha-
rassed” (κοντιζ+μενα κα	 διαταραττ+μενα), eventually caused as much
damage to their own lines as they did to the Romans (Polyb. 11.24.1).
Finally, one might also adduce Livy’s problematic description
of a battle that supposedly took place in 203 B.C.E. in the land of
the Insubrian Gauls between Mago’s Carthaginian army and Roman
forces under P. Quinctilius Varus and M. Cornelius. The Livian ac-
count, presumably derived from Roman annalistic tradition and thus
possibly apocryphal in nature, records that Punic elephants, which
had terrified the Roman cavalry (30.18.7), inflicted some damage
on the Roman lines before they were driven back with a shower of
41 For a detailed account of the campaign, see B. W. Henderson, “The Cam-
paign of Metaurus,” EHR 13 (1898) 625–42. Frontinus (Strat. 2.3.8) also provides
some detail, though he does not mention elephants.
42 See J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War: A Military History of the Second Punic
War (Warminster 1978) 189. Appian (Hann. 8.52) refers to fifteen elephants in Hasdrubal’s
possession.
43 Livy 27.49.1: “more of the elephants were slain by their own drivers than
by the enemy” (elephanti plures ab ipsis rectoribus quam ab hoste interfecti). Hasdrubal’s
innovation is also mentioned by Ammianus (25.1.15), who writes that the mahouts
of the Persian elephants encountered by Julian in 363 C.E. were equipped with “knives”
(cultros) for a similar purpose.
44 See Gowers (above, n.11) 46.
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javelins (30.18.10–11). Four of the enraged beasts succumbed to their
wounds (30.18.11).
Thus, Hannibal must have recognized that the use of elephants
in warfare could prove fruitful, especially a) against troops who had
not encountered them before, and b) against horsemen whose mounts
had not become accustomed to the elephant’s strange appearance and
smell. On the other hand, he must have been aware of the beast’s
shortcomings, particularly its propensity to cause damage to its own
lines. Hannibal, therefore, like many of the great generals, was pre-
pared to run calculated risks (itself a convention among Hellenistic
military leaders). Yet this philosophy often ran counter to that of
his generally more conservative Roman opponents, to whom the el-
ephant must have seemed of dubious value.45 Hannibal knew that
the employment of elephants—even well-trained ones—could be a
gamble, but it was a gamble that he, given his knowledge of the
creature and inherent self-confidence, was prepared to take.
III. Hannibal’s Elephants at the Trebia
Now it is time to review Hannibal’s experience of elephants during
his invasion of Italy.46 The only battle in which he was able to de-
ploy elephants with any real effect was at the River Trebia in 218
B.C.E.47 Still, the number of elephants available was not especially
large,48 and we cannot be sure about how many were used. Unfor-
tunately, two rather different versions exist with respect to where
the elephants were initially stationed. According to traditional inter-
pretations of Livy, Hannibal’s infantry were deployed in the center
and 10,000 cavalry distributed on both flanks, with the elephants
initially placed in front of these two cavalry wings: in cornibus
circumfudit decem milia equitum et ab cornibus in utramque partem
diuisos elephantos statuit (21.55.2). In the Loeb translation, this is
rendered as “the wings he formed of ten thousand horse, and, di-
viding his elephants, stationed them outside the wings.” But ab cornibus
need not necessarily mean “outside the wings [of cavalry],” as Fos-
ter translates.49 One might well adduce the idiomatic expression a
45 Of course, elephants, during the period which this article treats, were not
as readily available to Rome as they were to Carthage. This would have further
discouraged the Romans from making the effort to acquire them.
46 Nothing need be added to the already comprehensive literature on Hannibal’s
crossing of the Rhone and the Alps. With regard to the crossing, O’Bryhim (above,
n.12) 121–25 provides a compelling reinterpretation of the evidence.
47 G. Daly, Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War (Lon-
don and New York, 2002) 14: “late December 218 or perhaps early January 217.”
48 Polybius (3.42.11) tells us that thirty-seven elephants were taken across the
Rhone; see also App. Hann. 1.4; Eutr. Brev. 3.8.2. On Hannibal’s journey, see D.
Proctor, Hannibal’s March in History (Oxford 1971). But we are not told how many
elephants survived the Alpine crossing.
49 B. O. Foster, Livy, vol. 5 (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1929) 163; see
also Lazenby (above, n.42) 56: “outside the cavalry.” M. S. Dimsdale (Livy: Book
XXI [Cambridge 1914] 162), though he writes that ab cornibus “would generally
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tergo, usually translated as “in the rear.” Livy’s testimony can be
reconciled with Appian’s later account (Hann. 2.7), in which the elephants
are firmly placed in front of their own cavalry so that they face the
Roman horsemen: “and he ordered his own cavalry to remain quiet
behind the elephants until he should give the signal” (τοupsilongraveς δ; Jππας
κλευσεν *πσω τHν λεφντων τρεμε!ν). Gowers, following Livy, believes
that the elephants were used “as a screen for [Hannibal’s] . . . own
cavalry,” i.e., that they were placed directly in front of the Carthaginian
horse.50 Yet such a positioning is difficult to reconcile with the el-
ephants’ timely impact on the Roman infantry center.
According to most modern commentators, Polybius’ version of
events suggests that the beasts were placed in front of the “wings”
(κρατα) of the Carthaginian infantry rather than in front of Hannibal’s
cavalry. But the relevant section of Polybius is problematic: “divid-
ing also his elephants and placing them in front of the wings so
that his flanks were doubly protected” (τ- δ; θηρα μερσας πρ' τHν
κερτων, δι’ μφοτρων προεβλετο, 3.72.9).51 To arrive at the view
that the elephants were placed in front of the infantry wings, Walbank
points out that the above information needs to be read together with
mean ‘on the wings’,” believes that, on this occasion, “it must mean . . . on the
extreme left and right” (in order to accord better with 21.55.7). A. de Sélincourt,
tr., (Livy: The War with Hannibal [Harmondsworth 1972] 81) provides “with the
elephants beyond them [i.e., the two cavalry wings],” which could mean either in
front or outside. See also P. Jal, ed. and tr., Tite-Live: Histoire romaine, vol. 11,
Collection Budé (Paris 1988) 68: “à côté des ailes, répartis de chaque côté, il disposa
les éléphants” (see also 116–17 of the same volume, where greater credence is given
to the Polybian version: “il faut admettre qu’en ce cas, la cavalerie n’était pas
derrière eux”). Likewise, see J. Feix, tr., Livius: Römische Geschichte. Buch XXI–
XXIII (Munich 1974) 121: “die Elefanten verteilte er an den Flügeln.” M. T. Tatham
(Livy, Book XXI, with Introduction and Notes [Oxford 1899] 54) holds that the lo-
cus, with 21.55.7, means “away from the flanks,” i.e., that the elephants were stationed
“outside the two divisions of cavalry.” Still, he prefers Polybius’ arrangement.
50 Gowers (above, n.11) 45. See also T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Rome
against Carthage (London 1971) 50: “the cavalry, strengthened by elephants on ei-
ther flank.” See also P. R. Franke, “Pyrrhus,” CAH2 VII.2 (1989) 468, who believes
that Hannibal, at the Trebia, repeated Pyrrhus’ disposition of his elephants at Heraclea,
where they were stationed on the wings initially and served to frighten the Roman
cavalry.
51 For this interpretation, see Paton (above, n.13) 179: “he divided his cav-
alry, numbering, together with the Celtic allies, more than ten thousand, and stationed
them in front of the wings so that his flanks were doubly protected”; J. de Fou-
cault, ed., and E. Foulon, tr. and rev., Polybe: Histoires Livre III, Collection Budé
(Paris 2004) 101: “il divisa les cavaliers et les plaça sur chacune des deux ailes—
ils étaient plus de dix mille avec les alliés celtes; enfin il scinda ses éléphants et
les rangea devant les ailes de sa phalange”; I. Scott-Kilvert, tr., Polybius: The Rise
of the Roman Empire (Harmondsworth 1979) 242: “He also divided his force of
elephants and stationed them in front of the wings of the infantry phalanx, so that
his flanks were doubly protected.” These interpretations are supported by Lazenby
(above, n.42) 56; Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 159 (see also the diagram
of the battle on 160 and n.96 on 275–76); and F. W. Walbank, A Historical Com-
mentary on Polybius, vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) 406. It is worth adducing Polyb. 11.24.2,
where τ- . . . κρατα does refer to “the wings” of the Carthaginian infantry (intro-
duced by τKς . . . πεζικKς δυνμεως), as opposed to the center of the formation.
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elements of Polybius 3.73.7, where we are told that the Roman cavalry
fell back and left the Roman infantry flanks exposed.52 Thus the
standard interpretation is that Hannibal positioned his elephants in
front but towards the left and right extremes of the Carthaginian
infantry center.53
What can be done with these divergent traditions? It is overly
simplistic to state that one is entirely correct, and the other entirely
wrong (most usually that of Livy). Rather, we should find ways of
reconciling them. Although Livy’s description is clearly more rhe-
torical in nature, the elephants must have been relatively close to
the cavalry in order to explain his assertion, at 21.55.7, that they
were “on the outer extremities of the wings” or eminentes ab extre-
mis cornibus (which, again, does not necessarily mean that they were
outside the cavalry, especially given that, according to Polybius, there
seems to have been infantry wings on each side of the infantry center).54
Furthermore, we are told that the elephants terrified the opposing
cavalry with their strange smell and aspect (Livy 21.55.7). Of course,
that the Roman cavalry were terrified by the elephants is something
of a literary commonplace, and one, moreover, which does not re-
ally gel with Polybius’ account, where the Roman cavalry are driven
back by their opposite numbers (3.73.6–7).55 It is fitting, therefore,
to suppose that the elephants were positioned in front of Hannibal’s
line in two separate tactical units (as both traditions suggest), but
were stationed close enough to the cavalry to give rise to the Livian
version, itself probably derived from annalistic tradition. This ar-
rangement seems most sensible because it would have helped to secure
the Carthaginian flanks. In addition, it would have given to the el-
ephants the flexibility needed to intervene against the Roman infantry.
Now for the battle itself. The Roman infantry center held firm
(Polyb. 3.73.8), and the elephants were loosed against it (Polyb. 3.74.2;
Livy 21.55.9). Once again, two different traditions emerge. If we follow
Livy,56 the Roman light infantry successfully repelled the elephants
with their javelins and attacks on the beasts’ hindquarters (21.55.11),
to the extent that the elephants looked set to about-face (21.56.1).57
Fearing this, Hannibal transferred the now-maddened animals to the
52 Walbank (above, n.51) 406.
53 Dodge (above, n.40) 269–70 holds that, because the Roman front was longer
than that of the Carthaginians, there was an interval on each flank “between his
foot and horse,” and that Hannibal placed his elephants in this “interval.”
54 Of course, the possibility remains that Livy had misinterpreted his sources.
55 App. Hann. 2.7 records largely similar information. As Jal (above, n.49)
117 writes, “Polybe n’en dit mot.”
56 Older scholarship, such as that of Dodge (above, n.40) 270, gives complete
credence to this aspect of Livy’s account and does not find it strange that Polybius
omits it.
57 Silius Italicus (Pun. 4.610–621) writes of a solitary elephant being attacked
with missile weapons, falling and blocking the stream’s flow. It seems unwise to
make much of this.
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Roman left, where they caused the Gallic auxiliaries to break and
quit the field (Livy 21.56.1).58 It is difficult to ascertain how many
elephants survived, but Livy tells us that seven of the beasts that
had survived the Trebia perished in a subsequent winter storm
(21.58.11).59 Thus the Trebia, rather than an entirely successful de-
ployment of elephants, came perilously close to precisely the opposite,
at least if Livy is believed. On the other hand, Polybius fails to
record these details. That the Livian description could be derived
from earlier accounts that aggrandized Roman uirtus is not impos-
sible.60 Despite this, historical precedent for what Livy describes does
indeed exist—one need only think of Beneventum (or perhaps this
also was a fabrication to some extent). Should, then, we reject Livy’s
account out of hand?61 It would seem unwise to do so entirely. At
the very least, we might hold that the elephants had done their job
and were withdrawn in order to let the Carthaginian heavy infantry
attack the now-broken Roman ranks. Alternatively, Hannibal, realiz-
ing that the elephants were on the point of becoming uncontrollable,
withdrew them as a safety precaution and allowed them to attack
the more disorganized Gallic auxiliaries.
The Trebia, therefore, serves as another indication that even well-
trained elephants could prove a danger to the deploying side. At
the Trebia, the relatively small number of beasts perhaps allowed
58 Blaming Gauls, of course, is something of a commonplace.
59 Only one elephant survived the bitter winter of 218–217 B.C.E. (Livy 22.2.10;
Polyb. 3.74.11; Zonar. 8.24). Livy (22.2.10) writes that Hannibal rode this beast
when traversing marshy ground.
60 On this, see Dimsdale (above, n.49) 163; Jal (above, n.49) 117 (see also
lxv); W. Sontheimer, “Der Feldzug Hannibals in Oberitalien,” Klio 27 (1934) 112–
21; and Walbank (above, n.51) 406. But this sort of story accompanies many accounts
of elephants being used in battle (especially the Roman response to Pyrrhus’ beasts
at Beneventum, and even the later battle of Zama) and so is entirely creditable
from one perspective. Still, it could be argued that the Livian locus is simply a
reprise of such descriptions. E. Mellor (The Roman Historians [London and New
York 1999] 67–68) comments on Livy’s uncritical nature with respect to his favor-
ing of Roman annalistic tradition over Polybius’ supposedly more reliable testimony,
especially with respect to the Hannibalic war.
61 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 276, holds that, because Polybius omits
this detail, Livy’s version “must have been elaborated to honour Roman valour or
be due simply to his misunderstanding of his source.” Still, that Polybius wrote
before Livy does not ensure that his account of the Trebia is more accurate, par-
ticularly as O’Bryhim (above, n.12) 121–25 has shown that one of Livy’s two versions
of the Rhone-crossing records information completely ignored by Polybius, and that
this particular version may come closest to what actually happened (i.e., most—if
not all—of the elephants swam across). See Dodge (above, n.40) 182. As A. Erskine
(“Hannibal and the Freedom of the Italians,” Hermes 121 [1993] 62) points out, “it
is generally agreed that in book 21 and 22 Polybius was at no point a main source
[for Livy], although Livy or his source had most certainly consulted Polybius”;
likewise, Mellor (above, n.60) 67–68. H. Tränkle (Livius und Polybius [Basel and
Stuttgart, 1977] 193, 224–28) suggests that it was Livy’s source Coelius, rather
than Livy himself, who had consulted Polybius. This suggests, at the very least,
that Livy believed that Polybius’ version of the Trebia was a) not the most accu-
rate, or b) not suitable for chauvinistic reasons.
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Hannibal to exercise some kind of local control—and this regard-
less of whether the animals were actually in danger of turning on
their own line.62 That Hannibal, surely aware of the danger of de-
ploying elephants, was able to transfer the beasts with such effect
says more about the number of animals involved than it does about
his skill. It also speaks to the reliance that Hannibal placed on his
own personal fortune. Yet no one else appears to have succeeded in
pulling elephants back out of combat when they were perceived to
be getting into trouble—Pyrrhus was unable to manage such a ma-
neuver at Beneventum. According to Livy, Hannibal further demonstrated
his relative command of the beasts by transferring them to the left-
hand side of the field, where they were supposedly used against the
infantry of Rome’s Gallic allies. It might well be argued that the
main target of the elephants before and after their redeployment was
the enemy infantry—in the first case, Roman or Latin heavy infan-
try; and, in the second, their Gallic allies.63 To frighten the Roman
cavalry was not really their prime tactical objective on this particu-
lar occasion.64
IV. Elephants and Fabian Tactics
Edwards seems to believe that the Trebia is indicative of a con-
siderable Roman weakness against elephants.65 What really surprises,
however, is his claim that, if Hannibal had had more elephants with
him in Italy, he would have been better able to deal with Q. Fabius
62 This was something that Hasdrubal proved unable to replicate in the Metaurus
campaign, as seen above.
63 One might recall here the manner in which Antiochus I was able to terrify
his Celtic opponents in Galatia with a similarly modest number of beasts (i.e., six-
teen) (Lucian Zeux. 9–10).
64 An unwarranted amount of attention has perhaps been given to the elephant’s
effectiveness against cavalry, a view derived more from battles involving Hellenis-
tic princes (where generals with elephants regularly fought against other generals
with elephants) than the sort of engagements that interest us. Even B. Bar-Kochva
(The Seleucid Army [London 1976] 77) perpetuates this: “the main value of el-
ephants was as a ‘screen’ against cavalry.” But, by the time of the Pyrrhic and the
First and Second Punic Wars (which involved one opponent wont to use elephants
and another which did not), this was not always so. Indeed, some of the more
decisive engagements involving elephants in this period were characterized by the
beasts charging heavy-infantry formations, e.g., Pyrrhus at Asculum (Plut. Pyrrh.
21) and Beneventum (Plut. Pyrrh. 25), where the elephant charge was deflected. In
perhaps the most decisive instance, Xanthippus’ animals routed Regulus’ legionar-
ies at the Bagradas valley in 255 B.C.E. (Polyb 1.33–34). Elephants were also used
successfully by Hamilcar Barca against the Libyan and mercenary infantry in northern
Africa (Polyb. 1.76.3–8, 1.85.6–7). Of note, too, is that Scipio’s cavalry and uelites
attacked the Carthaginian elephants at Ilipa with much success (Polyb. 11.24.1).
Certainly, the Roman cavalry had no problem facing the elephants here and, if they
did not destroy all the beasts, at least prevented them from being brought to bear
in the main infantry fight.
65 In any case the battle was won, as Warry (above, n.18) 121 correctly points
out, “largely through a cavalry ambush” on Hannibal’s part.
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Maximus: “a significant elephant presence may have enabled Hannibal
to deal with Rome’s savior, Fabius ‘The Delayer.’ ”66 In any case,
Edwards forgets that Hannibal did in fact secure further elephants
after his initial force had been spent, perhaps to the tune of forty.
According to Livy 23.13.7, the Carthaginian “senate” decided to send
forty elephants to Hannibal in 216 B.C.E. In his description of op-
erations at Casilinum (216 B.C.E.), Livy mentions “a column of elephants”
(agmen elephantorum, 23.18.6), which beasts, as de Sélincourt and
Gardner Moore opine, must have been those destined to be sent to
Hannibal at Livy 23.13.7.67 But this seems impossible, for, at Livy
23.41.10, Bomilcar is described as having landed at Locri with re-
inforcements for Hannibal, which included an unspecified number
of elephants (215 B.C.E.).68 This was almost certainly the only occa-
sion when reinforcements from outside Italy reached Hannibal,69 which
suggests that the agmen elephantorum of Livy 23.18.6 is apocry-
phal. Elephants are also described at Livy 23.43.6, where we read
that Hanno brought the new elephants “from the land of the Bruttii”
(ex Bruttiis) to Nola, a town near which Hannibal was encamped.
These elephants seem to have made little impact—at Livy 23.46.4
is found a reference to four elephants being killed and two cap-
tured alive, a story repeated by Plutarch (Marc. 12.3).70 Three elephants
were also involved in attempts to storm the siege-works at Capua
(Livy 26.5.11),71 to which place thirty-three elephants, at least ac-
cording to one tradition, were originally led (Livy 26.5.3).72 The last
66 Edwards (above, n.2) 904.
67 De Sélincourt (above, n.49) 189 n.1; F. Gardner Moore, tr., Livy, vol. 6
(London and Cambridge, Mass., 1990) 60 n.1.
68 P. Jal, ed. and tr. (Tite-Live: Histoire romaine, vol. 13, Collection Budé [Paris
2001] 30 n.“d”), writes that “Qu’Hannibal ait eu encore des éléphants . . . à cette
date est étonnant (version annalistique?); ceux envoyés par Carthage n’arrivèrent
apparemment qu’en 215.” Feix (above, n.49) 335 makes no comment. Gowers and
Scullard (above, n.12) 280 hold that most of these elephants would have been Af-
rican, although the possibility exists that “a few” may have been Indian and were
obtained from Ptolemy IV.
69 Lazenby (above, n.42) 96.
70 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 163, alludes to coins hailing from Capua
and Atella, on which appear African elephants: “There can be no doubt that these
coins must be assigned to this period” (276). On this, see H. Mattingly and E. S. G.
Robinson, “The Date of the Roman Denarius and other Landmarks in Early Roman
Coinage,” PBA 18 (1932) 220. In 214 B.C.E., twelve elephants were landed by Himilco
in Sicily at a point near Heraclea Minoa, along with 25,000 infantry and 3,000
cavalry (Livy 24.35.3).
71 The attempt failed and the elephants were killed (Livy 26.6.1–2). Livy (26.6.9–
12) records that, in some accounts, the elephants managed to burst their way into
the Roman camp but “were driven out of the camp by means of fire” (elephantos
igni e castris exactos).
72 This is not mentioned by Polybius and could therefore come from an unre-
liable annalistic tradition. Scullard, “Hannibal’s Elephants” (above, n.11) 167–68,
rejects claims that the reference to elephants is unlikely, though he concedes that
Livy’s annalistic sources may have exaggerated their role in the fighting.
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time that we read of Hannibal’s elephants in Italy is at Livy 27.42.7,
where four were killed and two captured at Grumentum, a notice
which suspiciously mirrors Livy 23.46.4.73
Now one might recall that Fabius’ tactics, according to the tra-
ditional interpretation, involved not allowing his forces to meet those
of Hannibal in a pitched battle, especially since the dictator believed
that Rome would have come off second-best in set-piece contests
with the Carthaginians. Rather, Fabian tactics were of a more or
less guerrilla nature, i.e., they involved sporadic attacks on supply-
lines and skirmishes with isolated Carthaginian or allied units.74 The
elephant, it should seem obvious, would have been the least suc-
cessful means of combating rapidly moving Roman aggressors. Livy
(27.42.7), describing the death and capture of elephants at Grumentum,
aptly notes that the elephants proved to be useless in sudden en-
gagements. Just as tanks were of little use to American forces combating
Viet Cong irregulars, so, too, would elephants—the ancient equiva-
lent to the tank in terms of shock value against infantry and relative
immobility—have proved ineffective with respect to warding off Roman
guerrilla tactics. Edwards adds that
The elephant’s well-attested ability to devastate trees
and crops, to operate at night, and to limit the activities
of opposing cavalry, might have afforded Hannibal
the freedom he required to stifle Fabius’ harassing
tactics and hence force Rome’s hand.75
This makes little sense. Crop devastation, which seems to have been
most important to Hannibal in the early stages of the war (especially
since his own troops later suffered from the “scorched earth” policy
pursued by the Romans),76 could easily have been effected by more
conventional means, such as fire, than by elephants trampling about.
73 Although he does not make any connection between the two loci, Lazenby
(above, n.42) 185 reminds us that Carthaginian losses were wont to be inflated by
the Romans.
74 On these tactics, see Livy 22.12.8–10 (perhaps the classic description); Plut.
Fab. 2.5, 5.1–2, 14.1, 19.4; Marc. 9.2–4, 24.1–2. For a synthesis of modern opin-
ion, see A. Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman
Empire (London 2003) 36–37. But, for a thought-provoking reinterpretation, see P.
Erdkamp, “Polybius, Livy and the ‘Fabian Strategy,’ ” AncSoc 23 (1992) 127–47.
Erdkamp focuses on discrepancies that exist between Livy’s version and that of
Polybius, in whose account “Fabian tactics” play a less significant role.
75 Edwards (above, n.2) 904.
76 E. Bradford (Hannibal [London 1981] 95) likens this activity to Kutusov’s
policy during the 1812 campaign against Napoleon. Even in the war’s early stages,
Hannibal needed to occupy plains capable of affording sufficient pasturage (Plut.
Fab. 6.1), while, later on, he found it difficult to feed his army owing to a dearth
of supplies (Plut. Fab. 17.2). See also Plut. Fab. 7.2, where Hannibal orders that
Fabius’ fields be spared while those of other Romans be destroyed, in order that
the dictator might suffer the opprobrium of his people; see also Livy 22.12.6, which
describes Hannibal’s actions in 217 B.C.E.
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That elephants could operate at night, too, would not have given
Hannibal any real advantage, especially given the nature of the Roman
attacks.77 With respect to elephants being able “to limit the . . .
opposing cavalry,” again, the hit-and-run nature of Fabian tactics militates
against this—the advantage that elephants possessed over cavalry in
set-piece engagements would hardly have translated to an advantage
over the same adversaries in guerrilla warfare. Mobile cavalry aggressors
would simply have kept out of the elephants’ way. It is difficult to
imagine how a slow-moving elephant could have responded to cavalry
incursions over uneven or wooded terrain. One might well recall that
the Roman and allied troops largely kept to mountainous or wooded
areas effectively out of the reach of the more unwieldy Punic force.
Once again, elephants, even if they had numbered more than the
possible forty that Hannibal did eventually acquire, would not have
helped Hannibal at all in dealing with Fabian tactics. Indeed, a larger
number of slow-moving elephants would have slowed down the
movement of his troops even further.78 It would also have made
Hannibal’s forces even more vulnerable to enemy attack.79 Shean
aptly points out that, “from a logistical point of view,” the fact that
only one elephant survived Hannibal’s first winter in Italy “may well
have been a blessing in disguise.”80 One is inclined to agree.
To counter Edwards’ claim, it should be noted that Roman sol-
diers had previously shown themselves to be thoroughly adept at
keeping out of the elephants’ way by sticking to rough terrain. Plutarch
tells us that, on the first day of the engagement between Rome and
Pyrrhus at Asculum, the elephants could not operate owing to the
wooded terrain along the riverbanks (Pyrrh. 21.5). Still, on the next
day, Pyrrhus made sure that his elephants could operate on suitable
ground and eventually used the beasts to good effect when the Ro-
mans decided to offer battle (Plut. Pyrrh. 21.6). Sallust (Iug. 53.3)
also mentions that Numidian elephants became entangled “in the
branches of the trees” (impeditos ramis arborum) during the Jugur-
thine War, and adds that this, along with the actions of the Romans
themselves, resulted in four being captured and a further forty killed.
Glover notes that Xanthippus, in 255 B.C.E., “realized the mistake of
his predecessors . . . who had ‘wasted’ their elephants by occupying
77 In fact, nocturnal sorties would probably have been a successful means by
which the Romans could destroy the beasts, especially if they kept downwind.
78 On this, see Shean (above, n.10) 174–75. Shean suggests that, if Hannibal
had wanted to economize on the carrying capacity of his pack-animals, he would
have had to allow increased foraging time for his elephants, “which probably slowed
down the army’s rate of march” (175). This, of course, would have hardly been
desirable in Italy.
79 During Pyrrhus’ campaign against the Mamertines, the Mamertine army, knowing
that Pyrrhus would have their measure in a pitched battle, continued to harass the
Epirote army on the march (Plut. Pyrrh. 24.1). In these skirmishes, two of his el-
ephants were killed (Plut. Pyrrh. 24.1). This reminds us of so-called Fabian tactics.
80 Shean (above, n.10) 175.
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hilly country,”81 the implication being that elephants cannot be de-
ployed effectively over difficult terrain. More relevant, perhaps, is
that the Romans themselves took to hilly country around Lilybaeum
and Selinus in the First Punic War in order to avoid the Carthaginian
elephants (Polyb. 1.39.12). Likewise, Matho, in the Libyan War, ad-
vised his subordinates to harass the enemy from the foothills and
to keep their distance from the plains in order to avoid the Carthaginian
cavalry and elephants (Polyb. 1.77.1–2). Thus, having elephants in
Italy would not have helped Hannibal a jot, for the Romans were
already doing their best to avoid set-piece confrontations on ground
that would favor the normal Carthaginian battle plans, which obvi-
ously included the deployment of elephants.
These considerations bring us to the question of why Hannibal
even brought elephants to Italy in the first place. Clearly, elephants,
as weapons of war, are only really useful in set-piece engagements.
This is where they had found a degree of success in the past. Hannibal,
as noted, used his elephants with some minor success at the Trebia
(although it was not the principal cause of his victory), but almost
all died during the exceptionally harsh winter of 218/217 B.C.E. No
elephants, it seems clear, were deployed at Trasimene in 217 B.C.E.,
or at Cannae in 216 B.C.E.82 And perhaps this was a stroke of luck.
Overreliance on elephants may have caused Hannibal to ignore the
possibility of employing audacious encirclement techniques, in ad-
dition to his now-famous “Art of Cannae,” i.e., the use of the elements
to hinder the enemy.83 Hannibal’s request for more elephants dem-
onstrates that he maintained faith in the elephant as a weapon. But
Edwards may not be too far off the mark when he stresses the psy-
chological impact that elephants may have had with respect to winning
over potential allies in the Italian peninsula.84
81 Glover (above, n.40) 5. See Polyb. 1.30.8, 1.32.4; see also Polyb. 11.20.1–
2, where Hasdrubal Gisgo, with thirty-two elephants, avoids hilly country and chooses
an encampment bordering on a level plain suitable for battle (206 B.C.E.).
82 Only Silius Italicus records elephants at Cannae (e.g., 9.239–240, 9.577–
580, 9.599–604), but this “testimony” can be safely disregarded. J. Volpilhac-Lenthéric,
M. Martin, P. Miniconi, and G. Devallet (Silius Italicus: La guerre punique, vol. 3,
Collection Budé [Paris 1984] 177 n.22) suggest that the elephants were introduced
“pour donner une couleur exceptionnelle au combat,” while F. Spaltenstein (Commentaire
des Punica du Silius Italicus, vol. 2 [Geneva 1990] 23–24) holds that elephants, in
the Punica, form part of “l’image traditionnelle” of Hannibal’s army.
83 Flor. 1.22.16, 1.38.15; Frontin. Str. 2.2.7; Livy, 22.43.10–11, 22.46.8–9; Plut.
Fab. 16.1. The Byzantine account of Leo is similar in nature; see Str. 14.4. Polybius
says nothing about the effect of dust and wind. See also Veg. Epit. 3.14.1–3. Note
the fanciful version of the engagement penned by Silius Italicus, who describes the
wind or turbo (Pun. 9.491–523) that helped the Carthaginian weapons, but made
the Roman missiles fly backwards (Pun. 9.506–510). More on the wind is found at
Pun. 10.202–207. For modern discussion, see Daly (above, n.47) 43 and 168, who
points out that the importance of the dust was probably exaggerated by the Roman
sources. Hannibal may also have used a thick fog to his advantage at Trasimene;
see Livy 22.5.3–4.
84 Edwards (above, n.2) 904.
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That Hannibal believed foremost in the psychological value of
the elephant is suitably demonstrated by an anecdote recorded by
Pliny the Elder. Although he fails to name his source, Pliny writes
of a Roman soldier who, having been captured by Hannibal, was
compelled to fight one of the elephants single-handedly (HN 8.7.18).
He was promised his freedom if he could dispatch the beast, which,
much to the annoyance of the Carthaginians, he proceeded to do
(HN 8.7.18).85 The following is of especial interest: “Hannibal real-
ized that reports of this encounter would bring the animals into contempt,
so he sent horsemen to kill the man as he was departing” (Hannibal,
cum famam eius dimicationis contemptum adlaturam beluis intellegeret,
equites misit qui abeuntem interficerent, HN 8.7.18). The other Ro-
man captives mentioned at this locus must also have been killed at
the time, or else were not released. Although this particular tale may
be partly (or perhaps wholly) apocryphal,86 it nevertheless suggests
that Roman commentators believed that Hannibal was especially keen
to preserve the shock value of his elephants.
V. The Battle of Zama: Hannibal’s Elephant Swan Song
Zama (202 B.C.E.),87 waged between the armies of Hannibal and
Scipio, remains probably the most famous of all battles involving
elephants. Which species was used? Appian writes that Hasdrubal
Gisgo was dispatched to find elephants in Morocco in 205 B.C.E.
(App. Pun. 2.9), which almost certainly means that he was sent out
to acquire forest elephants.88 Evidence also exists to suggest that
Hannibal put off engaging Scipio until adequate elephants could be
found, which again points to forest elephants being collected hast-
ily in the surrounding countryside.89 The elephants used by Hannibal
early in the war were probably captured at quite a young age, i.e.,
when they were too small to be used in battle.90 Immature beasts
85 Pliny (HN 8.7.22) later tells us that, by the reigns of Claudius and Nero,
single-handed combat against an elephant was “the crowning exploit” (consummatio)
of a gladiator’s career.
86 The description of pairs of Hannibal’s Gallic captives fighting duels to the
death in 218 B.C.E., with freedom promised to the victors, is strikingly similar, though
neither elephants nor Roman soldiers are mentioned (Livy 21.42.1–43.1; see also
Polyb. 3.62.3–11, where only one pair of “gladiators” is found). Note that a “Carthaginian”
historical tradition did exist. For example, we read, at Nep. Hann. 13.3, that Silenus
and Sosylus of Lacedaemon accompanied Hannibal and recorded his deeds.
87 For an overview of the arguments relating to the battle site, see F. H. Russell,
“The Battlefield of Zama,” Archaeology 23 (1970) 120–29.
88 Unfortunately, Appian fails to tell us the number of elephants collected.
Forest elephants were captured traditionally with the aid of “pitfalls” (foueis, Plin.
HN 8.8.24).
89 Note, too, that no mention of missile weapons thrown by crewmen is found
in extant descriptions of the battle.
90 Scullard, The Elephant (above, n.11) 131, suggests that younger animals
were the preferred choice.
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would have proved more amenable to training than older specimens.
Yet when battle-sized elephants were required immediately, as in the
last months of the Second Punic War, Carthage would have had no
choice other than to capture animals of suitable size.91 These el-
ephants would have possessed thoroughly ingrained behavioral patterns
that would have been difficult to alter. In short, it was not easy to
teach old elephants new tricks. Despite this, it seems obvious that
the Punic battle plan was to revolve around these newly acquired
beasts.92
In all, Hannibal fielded at least eighty elephants,93 which were
placed in the van immediately opposite the massed Roman center.94
Our sources suggest that he preferred this arrangement in order to
shatter the enemy’s morale (App. Pun. 7.40; Livy 30.33.4; Polyb.
15.16.2; Zonar. 9.14). Appian insists that elephants also faced Scipio’s
cavalry on both wings (Pun. 7.43).95 But this, which recalls the usual
formulaic depiction of ancient elephant deployment, remains improbable.
Scipio anticipated Hannibal’s elephants by eschewing the traditional
checkerboard formation and creating passageways in his battle line
filled with light infantry or uelites that could quickly be opened up
in order to allow the beasts to pass through, as Frontinus (Str. 2.3.16),
Livy (30.33.1–3), and Polybius (15.9.7–10) explain.96 The uelites were
to withdraw to the rear or attack the elephants from the side of the
passageways as they traversed the Roman formation.97 In front of
each cohort, at least according to one oftentimes dubious tradition,
91 Likewise, those beasts collected by Hasdrubal Gisgo in 205 B.C.E. would
have been larger (and thus older) specimens than would normally have been desir-
able for training.
92 See especially Polyb. 15.16.2, where we are told that Hannibal “had hastily
collected that large number of elephants” (τ' μ;ν . . . τHν λεφντων πλKθος ξ
αupsilonlenisτKς παρεσκευσατο).
93 Polyb. 15.11.1: “over eighty” (τ- . . . θηρα . . . Mντα πλεω τHν *γδοκοντα).
Appian (Pun. 7.40), Frontinus (Str. 2.3.16), and Livy (30.32.4) all mention eighty
elephants. Of these eighty or so beasts, only eleven were later captured alive by
the Romans (Livy 30.35.3).
94 This is supported inter alios by K. W. Meiklejohn, “Roman Strategies and
Tactics from 509 to 202 B.C. (cont.),” G&R 8 (1938) 18.
95 Indeed, Appian fancifully writes that the elephants were defeated on the
wings (especial mention is made of Numidian horsemen discharging missiles at them),
while the Roman infantry in the center were in desperate straits until they were
saved by the Italian cavalry who, being led by Scipio himself, dismounted from
their frightened horses and successfully attacked the Carthaginian elephants à pied
(Pun. 7.43). On Appian and Zama, see especially Daly (above, n.47) 25.
96 Appian (Pun. 7.41) asserts that the passageways were for cavalry to pass
through (!). Perhaps Scipio arrived at this idea from accounts of previous battles.
For example, Lucian (Zeux. 9) tells us that the Galatians, when Antiochus I cam-
paigned against them, were expected to open up their phalanx so that their chariots
could pass through the infantry formation.
97 Scipio would not have wanted his heavy infantry to expend their pila against
the elephants. These would be needed to combat the first line of Carthaginian heavy
infantry.
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Scipio placed iron-tipped stakes about two cubits in length, which
a) were to be hurled at the advancing elephants, and b) would goad
them towards the passages (App. Pun. 7.41). He also advised his
soldiers to hamstring the beasts (App. Pun. 7.41). While the Numidian
cavalry were already trained to face elephants, each Italian cavalry-
man was supposedly accompanied by a javelin-wielding pedes,
“presumably to keep the elephants at a distance.”98 As Glover ob-
serves, Scipio (if we believe Appian) seems to have combined “practically
every known anti-elephant device, and threw in for good measure a
tactical formation of his own.”99 It might well be remembered that
Scipio, in 206 B.C.E., had already experienced Carthaginian elephants
firsthand at Ilipa and, moreover, had emerged victorious.
But Hannibal’s elephants, which have been described as “in all
probability inadequately trained,”100 became frightened at the sound
of the “trumpets and horns” (tubae cornuaque), in addition to the
accompanying shouting (Livy 30.33.13).101 Instead of doing dam-
age to the enemy, a portion of them ran into Tychaeus’ Numidians
and the Moors on the left wing, much to Masinissa’s delight (Livy
30.33.13; Polyb. 15.12.2). According to Livy, “a few of the beasts”
(paucae . . . bestiarum) did charge the Roman line, but the uelites
and antesignani dealt with them in admirable fashion (30.33.14–16).102
Indeed, the elephants were driven from Scipio’s formation by a hail
of missiles and turned against their own men and, in particular, the
Carthaginian cavalry on the right wing, who were also being attacked
by Laelius (Livy 30.33.15–16; Polyb. 15.12.4–5). Thus, Hannibal’s
use of elephants effectively put to flight both wings of Carthaginian
cavalry (Livy 30.34.1). Sabin, presupposing that only a portion of
the elephants could be deployed as planned, writes that Scipio’s counter-
98 Glover (above, n.40) 8.
99 Glover (above, n.40) 8.
100 B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London 1980) 251. Caven fails to describe the
type of elephants used; see also 253: “his elephants were not the noble beasts that
had crossed the Pyrenees.” Note, too, de Beer, Hannibal (above, n.12) 289; Bradford
(above, n.76) 196; Dodge (above, n.40) 603; Dorey and Dudley (above, n.50) 146.
101 Zonar. 9.14 follows this tradition, with the addition that the Roman sol-
diers added to the noise by “vigorously beating their shields with their spears”
(κα	 τ-ς σπδας το!ς δ+ρασι [sic] κροupsilonacuteσαντες θυμ)). Regulus’ men, when they were
about to face Xanthippus’ elephants, cheered and clashed their weapons against their
shields (Polyb. 1.34.1–2)—but this display does not seem to have affected the pre-
sumably better-trained beasts. Appian (Pun. 7.43) describes Hannibal’s elephants at
the battle of Zama as being “decked out in fearful panoply”: ς τ' φοβερ>τατον
σκευασμνοι [sc. οJ λφαντες]. This need not mean that Appian believed that the
elephants carried turrets. Indeed, P. Goukowsky, ed. and tr. (Appien: Histoire ro-
maine, vol. 4, Collection Budé [Paris 2001] 33), translates thus: “équipés de l’armement
le plus terrifiant.” In any case, the description may be anachronistic and influenced
by descriptions of the beasts of Hellenistic armies. On references to elephant ar-
mor and adornment, see E. L. B. Meurig Davies, “Elephant Tactics: Amm. Marc.
25.1.14; Sil. 9.581–3; Lucr. 2.537–9,” CQ n.s. 1 (1951) 153–55.
102 See also Polyb. 15.12.3–4.
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measures would have had the effect of “minimizing the disruption
and . . . giving his men the confidence to fight back.”103 Although
Scipio’s tactic was undoubtedly efficacious, Frontinus (2.3.16) goes
so far as to suggest that it was the deciding factor in the contest.
Polybius also pays somewhat greater attention to the stratagem than
Livy, who focuses more on the beasts wreaking havoc among their
own men. Of course, such views may be the legacy of a laudatory
tradition aggrandizing Scipio’s deeds, particularly when the real cause
of the Carthaginian defeat probably lay more in their unprepared
state than in Scipio’s military genius.
So to what extent does Zama demonstrate Hannibal’s ability to
manipulate elephants in battle? While Edwards holds that, at Zama,
“It is a wonder that Hannibal could so easily lose control of his
elephants,” it seems obvious, as has been pointed out earlier, that
most (if not the entirety) of his elephants were inadequately trained.104
The much larger number present would also have made it impos-
sible for Hannibal to exercise local control as he may have done at
the Trebia. Thus, it could be argued that Hannibal erred in deploy-
ing them at all. If Edwards’ thesis that Hannibal knew more about
elephant behavior than any previous general has any merit at all,105
the general should have realized the great danger that maddened beasts
could do to their own battle line should things go awry.106 And go
awry they did. But Hannibal probably had little choice other than
to employ elephants en masse in the preferred Carthaginian way.
Bradford suggests that, rather than committing a “tactical error,” as
some have argued, Hannibal “was compelled to . . . [deploy elephants]
through his shortage of cavalry.”107 Scipio, it is widely held, had a
clear advantage in this respect. Furthermore, only a relatively mod-
est number of Hannibal’s troops were battle-hardened veterans.
What needs to be borne in mind is that Zama was the last throw
of the dice. Both Polybius and Livy, although they obviously seek
to add dramatic flavor to their narratives, give the impression that
Hannibal knew this, to the extent that securing an honorable peace
(perhaps in order to buy more time) was probably the best of his
options.108 What is more, he must have had little faith in the ability
103 Sabin (above, n.19) 70.
104 Gowers (above, n.11) 46 wonders if Indian elephants “would have been so
rattled.”
105 Edwards (above, n.2) 905. But he gainsays himself on the same page by
stating that “his defeat came about as a result of over-relying on elephants, crea-
tures about which he knew too little” (!).
106 Edwards (above, n.2) 903 n.18 makes the comment that Hannibal’s elephants
at Zama proved “a liability rather than an asset.” See also Dorey and Dudley (above,
n.50) 144.
107 Bradford (above, n.76) 196.
108 According to the extant tradition, Hannibal sued for peace as the two armies
faced each other, but Scipio rejected the offer (Livy 30.30–31; Polyb. 15.6.3–8.14).
On Scipio’s confidence, see Bradford (above, n.76) 199; Cottrell (above, n.12) 236;
B. D. Hoyos, “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?” G&R n.s. 30 (1983) 176–77; and
MICHAEL B. CHARLES AND PETER RHODAN
385
of his own troops, as a whole, to beat Scipio in a stand-up infantry
fight.109 Lazenby, while he correctly recognizes that Hannibal was well
aware of the elephant’s “strengths and weakness,” believes that he
may have hoped that for once they would do their
stuff . . . but he may secretly have thought that most
of them would do precisely what they did do—swerve
out to the flanks and disrupt his cavalry, thus aiding
the deception.110
Lazenby’s contention presupposes that Hannibal, who realized that
his cavalry arm was deficient, was prepared to sacrifice his horse-
men in order to lure the Roman cavalry away from the central action.
This seems a rather odd attempt to reconcile Lazenby’s belief in
Hannibal’s military genius with the woeful performance of his el-
ephants at Zama. If Hannibal truly understood the elephant’s volatile
nature, he would have known that it was impossible to predict in
which direction the beasts would turn when panicked. In any case,
such a ruse—if ruse it was—did not help Hannibal to win the battle.
Hannibal’s belief that Roman infantry who had never witnessed an
elephant charge would readily cave in to the beasts was somewhat
misplaced.111 Indeed, he seems to have paid insufficient attention to
the fact that their commander had already experienced elephant warfare
in Spain, as discussed above. Moreover, Hannibal probably had little
idea of the tactical surprise that Scipio had in store.112 Thus, to use
H. H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (London 1970) 142–43.
But see also Dorey and Dudley (above, n.50) 145. Mellor (above, n.60) 61 writes
that the meeting “is fictitious, though it encapsulates the confrontation better than
any description of battle tactics.”
109 Hannibal deployed three lines of infantry: a) Mago’s experienced merce-
naries; b) Carthaginian levies, Africans, and Macedonians; and c) his reserve of
Italian veterans (App. Pun. 7.40; Livy 30.33.5–7; Polyb. 15.11.1–2). Hannibal’s thinking
seems to have proved correct, for the Roman hastati made short work of the first
line, and, after being reinforced by the principes, dealt with the second. It was
only the third line that could match the now-tired Roman infantry. But the deploy-
ment of the triarii and the return of Scipio’s cavalry sealed the Roman victory.
The point of leaving the veterans in the third line (as would normally have been
the case) was that the bulk of the Roman infantry would have been exhausted by
the time that they reached them. For a diagrammatic representation, see A. Goldsworthy,
Roman Warfare (London 2002) 82–83.
110 Hoyos (above, n.108) 176 supports this view. That Hannibal may have wanted
his cavalry to lure Scipio and Masinissa’s equites away from the central action is
not entirely improbable.
111 One commentator even suggests that “[t]he Romans had little fear of el-
ephants now” (Meiklejohn [above, n.94] 18 n.1). Dorey and Dudley (above, n.50)
144 agree.
112 Gowers (above, n.11) 47 wonders whether the elephants’ charge, if Scipio
had failed to counter it so effectively, “might well have been the decisive factor in
a victory for Hannibal.” Likewise, B. H. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon:
Scipio Africanus (New York 1976; repr. of 1927 ed.) 179–80: “How decisive might
have been the charge . . . is shown by the havoc they wrought at the outset among
the velites”; see also Hoyos (above, n.95) 177.
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the “militarily correct” way of deploying elephants was, with the
advantage of hindsight, quite inadequate, though we should remem-
ber the engagement’s somewhat desperate context.
The maintenance of competitive advantage is inextricably linked
to innovation. On this occasion, Scipio had wrested the competitive
advantage from his inadequately prepared enemy by being not one
but several steps ahead.113 Something out of the ordinary was re-
quired on Hannibal’s part, but he was granted neither the time nor
the resources to execute it. Scipio’s stratagem of having the beasts
channeled through his maniples was not even wholly necessary, for
we have noted that a significant portion of the elephants failed to
engage the enemy. Instead, they crashed into Hannibal’s own cav-
alry. Edwards proposes that the elephants, instead of being arrayed
against the Roman center, should have been specifically directed
against Scipio’s strong cavalry component.114 But it is doubtful that
Scipio, thoroughly cognizant of the strengths and weaknesses of these
beasts, would have allowed that to happen if he did not desire it—
one could even argue that this deployment would not have displeased
the Roman general, especially since his manipular arrangement dem-
onstrates his keenness to save the heavy infantry for the real contest.
Edwards’ suggestion appears to be derived from the frequent view,
espoused by Connolly inter alios, that the “prime object [of the
elephants] . . . was to stop the cavalry.”115 A close reading, how-
ever, of the extant accounts of most battles involving elephants (and
especially forest elephants) will clearly reveal that their main—and
generally most effective—use was against massed enemy infantry.
In any case, the large number of elephants collected for the battle
(which would have been difficult to hide) seems to have immedi-
ately told Scipio that a massed frontal assault was the plan. Indeed,
the only real documented means of effectively using forest elephants
in very large numbers was exactly as Hannibal deployed them, i.e.,
in a concentrated frontal attack followed by a massed infantry as-
sault. Xanthippus, the Spartan mercenary general, certainly achieved
success by this means when he loosed “very nearly a hundred el-
ephants” (τ' δ; τHν λεφντων πλKθος γγιστ που τHν @κατ+ν) in a
frontal assault against Roman legionaries in the spring of 255 B.C.E.
at a location not far from Tunis (Polyb. 1.32.9).116 Xanthippus’ ele-
113 Scipio’s ability to wrest and maintain the initiative is commented upon by
Liddell Hart (above, n.112) 189: “he had compassed their moral disintegration to
pave the way for the final act.”
114 Edwards (above, n.2) 903. Masinissa provided 4,000 cavalrymen for Scipio
(Livy 30.29.4).
115 P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London 1981) 74. This view is
firmly entrenched in the older scholarship; see, e.g., Dodge (above, n.40) 131.
116 On Xanthippus and his thoughts on the deployment of elephants on flat
ground, see Polyb. 1.32.4, with 11.20.1–2, where Hasdrubal entrenched himself just
above an open plain that would ultimately favor his forces, which included thirty-
two elephants. For modern commentary on the Bagradas valley, see B. Bleckmann,
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phants charged the Roman center, which had been deployed in a
“line shorter [i.e., more frontally compact] and deeper” (τFν δ; σupsilonacuteμπασαν
τξιν βραχυτραν μ;ν) than had been employed before (Polyb. 1.33.10).117
According to Polybius, those who survived the charge were left to
face the fresh Carthaginian phalanx (1.34.6). The exhausted Romans
were annihilated. But the Romans in 255 B.C.E. had not seen el-
ephants since the Pyrrhic campaigns of some twenty-five years before.
Scipio at Zama, with his battle-hardened troops, was another matter
entirely. Thus Hannibal’s use of elephants at Zama, rather than dem-
onstrating any particular affinity with these creatures, shows the general
to have been entirely conventional. And conventionality was never
certain to bear fruit against the arguably more energetic and well-
prepared Scipio, a general who had no wish to become another Regulus.
VI. Post Datum to Zama
Although elephants were used in a variety of military encoun-
ters after Zama, most notably at Magnesia, Pydna, and Cynoscephalae,
it is the battle of Thapsus (46 B.C.E.), waged between the dictator
Julius Caesar and the Pompeian champion Metellus Pius Scipio (supported
by the Numidian king Juba), that deserves our attention. This is be-
cause, in some ways, Thapsus is reminiscent of Hannibal’s deployment
of African elephants at Zama. Helpfully, one of our principal sources
is the unknown author of the Bellum Africum, a writer who, if not
an eyewitness himself, would have at least been able to discuss de-
tails with eyewitnesses, including perhaps Caesar himself.118 Scipio
drew up an unspecified but appreciable number of elephants to face
the Roman ranks.119 Unlike Zama, however, the elephants, at least
Die römische Nobilität im Ersten Punischen Krieg. Untersuchungen zur aristokratischen
Konkurrenz in der Republik, Klio Beiträge zur alten Geschichte 5 (Berlin 2002)
167–68.
117 See Zonar. 8.13, where we read that the elephants routed the Roman cav-
alry. J. F. Lazenby (The First Punic War [London and New York, 2003] 105) describes
this account as something that “we can ignore.”
118 Caesar ordered elephants to be brought “from Italy” (ex Italia) to Africa
so that his soldiers might become accustomed to them. Caesar wanted his soldiers
to become acquainted with the skills needed to inflict damage “when an elephant
was accoutred and armoured”: ornatusque ac loricatus cum esset elephas (B Afr.
72.4). At B Afr. 86.1, we read that Caesar paraded sixty-four beasts “armed and
complete with towers” (armatosque cum turribus) in front of Thapsus in order to
secure the submission of its inhabitants. References to turrets are also found at B
Afr. 30.2 and 41.2, though the brief accounts of Appian (B.C. 2.96–97), Cassius
Dio (43.3.5, 43.8.1–2), and Florus (2.13.67) do not mention them. See also de Beer,
Hannibal (above, n.12) 104: “The African Forest elephant was too small and seems
never to have carried a castle, but to have been ridden bareback.” Cornelius Nepos
(Hann. 3.4) also writes of elephanti ornati, or elephants “with their equipment,”
crossing the Alps, but this need not necessarily refer to towers.
119 These particular elephants were surely of the forest type. Sixty-four el-
ephants are mentioned after the conclusion of the battle (B Afr. 86.1), but the number
that actually fought remains unclear. Other accounts (above, n.118) shed no light
on this matter.
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if our main source is given credence, were “posted on the right and
left wings” (elephantis dextro sinistroque cornu conlocatis, B Afr.
81.1). Always a good student of military history, Caesar ordered light
infantry including archers, slingers, and spearmen to preempt the
impending charge “on the right wing” (a dextro . . . cornu) by at-
tacking the beasts (B Afr. 83.2). Not unpredictably, the animals, now
maddened by blows and thoroughly intent on escape, about-faced
and ran through the massed ranks of their own lines (B Afr. 83.2;
Flor. 2.13.67). They wreaked a good deal of havoc and allowed Caesar’s
men to make short work of the enemy troops (B Afr. 83.2–4). Simi-
lar events must have occurred on the left flank, for we read of a
veteran of the Fifth hacking at a trunk that had encircled him; this
rather sensible action caused the beast to drop him and turn about
(B Afr. 84.1–4). Of especial interest to us is Florus’ statement that
the elephants of Juba were “unaccustomed to war and only recently
brought from the woods” (bellorum rudes et nuperi a silua, 2.13.67),
a claim which suggests that they were of a similar character to Hannibal’s
elephants at Zama. That history is wont to repeat itself is a much-
used commonplace, but here, at least, is an occasion where its application
is not entirely unwarranted.
VII. Conclusion
As Sabin succinctly points out, “[w]ar elephants were not re-
sponsible for any decisive successes in the Hannibalic War.”120 On
the one occasion that Hannibal did employ elephants with a modi-
cum of success, i.e., at the Trebia, they were not directly responsible
for the engagement’s outcome. In addition, we have seen that ele-
phants, pace Edwards, surely would not have been able to turn the
tide of the Italian war in Carthage’s favor. Against a mobile Roman
army that refused to give battle in a conventional sense, an even
larger elephant corps would have been almost completely useless.
Indeed, it would have created a logistical nightmare for the Carthaginian
forces. In the final encounter of the war, elephants, if properly trained,
may have been able to play a part, but Hannibal saw no reason to
use the beasts in an innovative fashion. Hannibal’s use of recently
captured and thus unreliable elephants was not necessarily wrong—
he had surely weighed the odds and decided that, given the dire
circumstances, it was a gambit that he was prepared to play.121 Sadly,
at least for Hannibal, Scipio had the answer to the elephant ques-
tion, and the Punic elephants, when they were not doing damage to
Hannibal’s own troops, were unable to inflict any real damage on
the enemy infantry against which they had been arrayed. Hannibal,
surely cognizant of the war elephant’s unpredictable nature, was
120 Sabin (above, n.19) 70.
121 J. F. Lazenby, “Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, Rankov, and Sabin (above,
n.19) 40.
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prepared to take risks with pachyderms throughout his career. The
more clinical Scipio, on the other hand, was a general who left little
to chance. In sum, we have seen that Hannibal, far from possessing
any exceptional ability in using elephants in battle, did not really
advance elephant warfare. Given the general ineffectiveness of el-
ephants in the Second Punic War, both against Rome and her allies,
it seems that capturing, training, maintaining, and deploying elephants,
despite Hannibal’s somewhat misplaced confidence in their effectiveness
and reliability, was hardly worth the effort.
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